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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was brought by plaintiffs to recover damages 
based on failure of the defendant B;'>.;~K OF EPHRAIM to enforce cer-
tain obligations against a co-maker of a note and for damages 
arising out of various acts of intentional interference with busi-
ness relations and slander. Defendants BARTON counterclaimed 
on various grounds, including obligations claimed due from one 
of the plaintiffs. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After trial before The Hon. Peter F. Leary, Judge in 
the Third Judicial District, sitting with a jury, seven of plain-
tiffs' ten causes of action were dismissed by the court and three 
causes of action were submitted to the jury, resulting in verdicts 
for defendants and against plaintiffs. As to the counterclaims of 
defendants BARTON, the jury gave judgment against plaintiff CHARLES 
R. KENNEDY on three causes of action, found for plaintiffs and 
against counterclaimants on two causes of action and the court 
dismissed the Sixth Cause of Action of counterclaimant GEORGE 
BARTON and all of the counterclaims of BERTHA BARTON. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants respectfully request that the court reverse 
Portions of the judgment on which the trial judge ruled as a matter 
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of law and dire'c::t en<::c of =-:::;r:tent in favor of plilintiffs with 
respect to enforcement of t~~ obligations of defendant GEORGE 
BARTON. Plain~iffs also see~ ~ev1sion of one jury verdict which 
was contrary to the ev~dence ~~d the instruc::tions. 
Plai~_':iff CE.~.RLES ~. '\E:-:J:;EDY (hereinafter "KENNEDY") 
and defendant G~ORGE 3~PTON -erelnafter "Kl..'<TON") were close per-
sonal and busi~ess assc::ciate~ ~or many years. Their business 
associations ir:::ludeo =. "jo2_~_-: venture" along 1-1ith several other 
persons doing b~siness as a: ·, inc0rrJora tecl c;roup, looseLy reter rec 
to as a partnership. oise known as the Barton Syndicate. 
This group, organize~ ~r~o:c -· 1967, owned certain mining claims 
in the Oquirrh :·iountcn:_s of 2'0:',t Lake Valley (R. 65)). (The court 
will observe t~at for consis~C'~cy, appellants refer to the pages 
of both the Re~orter's Transc:;~2_pt and the clerk's collection of 
documents by the page :!umbe~ <ssiqnecl by 'che clerk in preparing 
the record for appeal, notw~-:~standing that a different page number 
was originally -ossig:1c":: in ~ ·-= trar.script by the reuorter) 
In the fall of 19~- KE'l:iLDY desire(! additional funds fo' 
other business purposes and c:: _ :-.sul ted with B:\RTON concerning ob-
taining a loan :'rom d0':c:nda:_- .HE B.'\'iK OF J:Pil''i\Hl ('•ereinafter 
the "BA.c\K") . ;"'= tha': -:.:..;c',e s: _ 2.t all times since, BARTON y;as a 
Director of t~lE' BANK as ··.el ~ a s~bstuJ1tial stoc:-:holder (R. 89]). 
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BARTON wrote a letter of recommendation to the BANK in 
connection with KENNEDY's application for a $40,000.00 loan (R. 682 
and Exh. 16-P). Thereafter and on or about November 27, 1967, the 
8.1\NK granted to KENNEDY the loan of $40,000.00 1-1i th the stipulation 
in the BANK's own documents that GEORGE BARTON would be a co-signer 
(Exhs. 34-P and 26-d). At the time the loan was made to KENNEDY 
and co-signed by BARTON, KENNEDY paid BARTON the sum of $499.98 
as a "commission" or a "finder's fee" pursuant to check dated Novem-
ber 23, 1967 (Exh. 18-P), which was subsequently endorsed by BARTON 
(R. 793) and paid by KENNEDY's bank on December 5, 1967 (Exh. 19-P). 
This fee represented part of the consideration for the co-maker's 
signature of BARTON, along with other transactions which continued 
to be engaged in between KENNEDY and BARTON. 
At or about the time the loan was made, BARTON agreed 
to pledge a Certificate of Deposit owned by him as collateral for 
the loan (R. 684). That pledge was made within 60 to 90 days follow-
ing granting of the loan and was designed to satisfy the bank 
examiners with respect to collateral on the loan (R. 786 and 899) 
From time to time, the loan was renewed in varying amounts, but the 
savings certificate continued to be pledged for the loan (Exh. 34-P 
and R. 785). One of the renewal notes is shown as Exh. 21-P and 
the savings certificate is shown as Exh. 17-P. 
The loan subsequently became delinquent, but the KENNEDYS 
~ere unable to pay the amount when due. The BANK thereafter 
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brought suit against CHARLES R. and REBECCA Z. KENNEDY in Sanpete 
County, Utah. Although GEORGE BARTON was also named as a defenda:r: 
1 
in the Complaint, he was never served and rro action was taken agai:,: 
him in connection with that matter. On or about July 19, 1973, 
judgment was entered ~gainst defendants KENNEDY in that action 
in a hearing which was held without the presence of the KENNEDYS, 
who had requested a continuance by reason of illness. The matter 
was, therefore, treated essentially as a default matter. (Se" the 
entire file in the prior action, Exh. 58-d). 
Subsequently, the business and personal associations 
between KENNEDY and BARTON deteriorated into less friendly rela-
tionships. Disagreements arose concerning sale of claims owned oy 
the Barton Syndicate, concerning transfers of various interests 
in the syndicate and also concerning efforts at collection of the 
judgment held by the BANK against the KENNEDYS. 
to collect against GEORGE BARTON on the note. 
No effort was mad2 
'l'he KENNEDYs brought suit alleging various damages agair,: 
all parties in ten causes of action. After trial in this matter, 
the court d1smisscd seven of the causes of action as a matter of 
law plus portions of the other causes and submitted certain porti~ 
of three causes of action for lUry dotermination. Appellants herf 
claim that the court's orders were erroneous as they affected the 
obligations of GEORGE BARTO~ on THE H~NK or· EPHRAIM note and the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-5-
savings certificate held as collateral. In addition, the jury 
verdicts,as hereinafter detailed, were erroneous in certain re-
spects by reason of improper instructions from the court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT THE BANK OF EPHRAI!:-1 SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO ENFORCE 
THE OBLIGATIONS OF DEFENDANT GEORGE BARTON, INCLUDING OFFSET 
OF THE PLEDGED SAVINGS CERTIFICATE. 
A. Having purposely failed to sue defendant GEORGE BARTON, 
The Bank of Ephraim must be ordered to offset the pledged 
Certificate of Deposit. 
The most serious of the wrongs here disputed on appeal 
relate to the knowing and intentional plan implemented by the BANK 
and BARTON to relieve BARTON of any responsibility whatever, not-
withstanding his clear legal obligations as co-signer on the note 
and pledgor of collateral. The facts are clear and substantially 
undisputed on this point. Exh. 21-P, which was the last renewal 
note in the series before the note which was subsequently incor-
porated in a judgment, amply demonstrates the relationships of 
ilie parties. Although the KENNEDYS used the trade style "The Ken-
nedy Company Enterprises", the note was signed by CHARLES R. KENNEDY 
and REBECCA Z. KENNEDY, his wife, as individuals. On the reverse 
of the note appears the clear language: 
Ephraim, Utah December 18, 1970 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, we hereby guarantee payment 
of the within note, waiving demand of payment, 
protest and notice of non-payment 
/s/CHARLES R. KENNEDY 
/s/REBECCA Z. KENNEDY 
/s/GEORGE BARTON 
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Absolutely no question can exist reqarding the intent of GEORGE 
BARTON and the corresponding intent of the B?~NK that BARTO'J would 
be obligated to pay the note when due in the event 1t w~s not 
otherwise paid. BARTON received consideration which was legal 
and enforceable (legal consideration not required to be in exact 
equivalent amount) when he accepted, endorsed and cashed Exh. l8-D, 
which evidenced lns intent to receive a co!1Ullission for help1nq 
KENNEDYs to obtain the loan and co-signing the loan (R 793). 
BARTON acknowledged that he hoped to be paid for his services 
in that connection (R. 967). BARTON's obligation as co-signer 
was part of the design from the very inception of the first loan 
on November 27, 1967 (Exh. 26-d). BARTON endorsed the savings 
certificate as collateral to THE Bi'.NK OF EPHRAIM for the same 
note which was executed by the KENNEDYs and co-signed by BARTON 
(Exh. 17-P and R. 785). Yet BARTON acknowledged, notwithstanding 
his intent to pledge the CD and continue to b~ obligated on the 
note (R. 785 and 786), that he was never served with Summons in 
the prior action by the BANK against KENNEDYs (as confirmed by 
Exh. 58-d) artd that no JUdgment v/ClS reHlerrcd agains'_ him (P. 789). 
Yet BARTON was more than just a passive co-obligor, who was for-
tunately escaping his legal obligations. By design betweer1 the 
BANK and BARTON, at the default heari;,c; ir, l 'J7 3, Bi\RTON 
in court as a witness against the KEYNEDYs (R. 78R) and all of 
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this after Bl\RTON had been so happ~· to recommend that the BANK 
make the loan to the KENNEDYs (R. SOl and Exh. 16-P). 
The BANK's own summary of the initial loan (Loan Pro-
gram, Exh. 26-d) was completed in the handwriting of VIRGIL 
JACOBSEN, former BA~K President (R. 771). That document clearly 
shows that GEORGE BARTON was inte~ded to be a co-signer on the 
note at the inception. Mr. JACOBSE~ was deceased prior to the 
time of trial, but portions of his deposition were read into 
the record (R. 767-769). Without reproducing all of the rele-
vant testimony in detail in this Brief, we believe the testimony 
of Mr. JACOBSEN can be summarized correctly as follows and con-
firms the position of KENNEDY against that of BARTON: 
(a) BARTON put up the certificate at the time 
the loan was made because he was a friend of Mr. 
KENNEDY, and BARTON was willing to back the faith 
in him by putting up the $50,000.00 collateral. 
(b) Mr. KENNEDY ~as not asked to put up any 
collateral at the tine. 
(c) BARTON became co-endorser of the note as 
well as the certificate. 
(d) The BANK has never executed against the 
collateral and has certainly not ever requested 
that BARTO~ pay off the note. 
(e) At the time the loan was made, Bl\RTON said 
he would repay the loan, and that if he had to pay 
it he would because he didn't have any choice. 
(f) If /lr. KEN~EDY doesn't pay the bill, the 
BANK would have no recourse but to go against the 
collatcoral. 
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(g) The c=c:::tifL:o:':ce v:as tenclc::::ed ~-- :Ji\RTON 
·.-1ithin 60 to :J dci·:.s :1ft'2r the o~-:jiJ1:~2- lnan v.1us 
made. 
taken in the 
co~~ext o~ the B~:K doc_~ents, clear~; de~s~stra~~s that at the 
~·n shoctly 
OF :C:?HRAI:' that ~_:_?.TO:: s.---.aulc '-lave to pav ~".2 no:ce, through the 
It is 1 
incredible to re·:~e-.-~ t'.e recar::'. and concL.:::.eo the.~ subsequent to 
the defau~ t on t".e no~c and :z:::·:cmDY' -~ inab: :'i ty to pay the same, 
I 
)Jd~ 
I 
certifi-
no\ 
exercisec t~e r_~'-)t o~ ~oreclasure or offse:c aqainst the 
in t'le prior Sar.;:ete Cc.;nty cc.cc:ion, eond has kn•>.·,·_:·yly and jnten-
tionally' ?ermitted a le:;-al ob:..igor 7_a be r:oliccv'?C.: of obliyations: 
that the court s.:-.ould :::-2u,uire THE B..:...~~K OF =?H~~I:1 to exercise i~ 
ric;:-:~ to offset -::'Je f·.- ::s re::>:cesent(·cl by t".e sa :inqs certi ficat2 
agai..1st the pas-r::-d 1E:: :.;::~~C1Zi":::_:JrJ t11 c·:-t:-;ch2r~· or •rtial clischarc' 
tl-:eccof. the 3ANK ~~s kno~ingly permitt~ 
B~?:O~ n3: be c ser:.~ 
a:1 :.::tio:: upon _ liab~ _ _:__ t·i f~'l'__::--l,lec~ __ ;_;O!l Cl:- -Tl~·'"=: -ertt in vni ti: l 
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section 78-12-23 Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, would be appli-
cable. That statute corrunenced run:-,ing no later than April 27, 
1972, when the Sanpete County action was filed (Exh. 58-d) and, 
thus, the statutory period expired in April, 1978, if not earlier. 
BARTON is left completely off the ~ook! 
A few comments are appro?riate regarding the equities 
of the case. The record reflects that the funds derived from the 
initial loan at THE BAl\iK OF EPHRAI:.l were used by KENNEDY in other 
investments. KENNEDY acknowledged that the debt was due, subject 
only to such counter-claims and of=sets as KENNEDY would have 
against THE BANK OF EPHRAIM and/or BARTON. The rhetorical ques-
tion is, "lvhy should BARTON be forced to pay any of that debt through 
the certificate or otherwise?" The most fundamental answer is that 
he agreed to do so, and the BANK accepted the obligation in reli-
s. ance on the expectation that BARTO:! would pay or that the certi-
t.' ficate would be used to pay. The next fundamental answer arises 
from the unique relationship obvio~sly inherent where BARTON is 
_, both a Director and a substantial stockholder of the BANK and is 
rr' in a position to influence the B.'\TZ management to pursue only 
~ KENNEDY rather than pursuing him. Such improper influence should 
a.· not be countenanced by this court. Moreover, KENNEDY and BARTON 
h3d other business transactions, i~cluding one that is still very 
:<uch open conccrrnnrJ the Barton S~:;-c:1icate claims, i;-1 r,,•hich obliga-
·ions clain•r•cl clr:e .1s bc'c·.-:e>en B.-\ 10.':--\,:: and KENNEDY cou~d properly be 
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adjusted. For the BANK to proceed without enforcing the just 
obligation against BARTON or the col1ateral is both irocn':lral and 
unlawful. 
The record contains some disagreement as to ~hether 
it was intended at the 1nception of the loan and the pl~dgc of 
the certificate that BARTON's certificate would be the first sourc' 
of funds upon default of the note in question. rrhat issue 1;/aS I1Ut 
clearly resolved and does not have to be in order for this ~ourt 
to provide the relief sought by appellants. \~hether or not the 
certificate was to be the first source of repayment without pursu~ 
other action is now irrelevant. 
ficate \vas to be used in the event of default, that Hr. B.".RTON p~t' 
up the certificate for that purpose (R. 767-769), the certificate 
itself states that it is collateral to the loan (Exh. 17-?) and 
BARTON agreed in writing that he would guarantee the payment of 
the note (Exh. 21-P). 
Even though rt is not necessary for the court to detel-
mine whether or not an agreement existed regarding the certifi-
cate's becoming the first source ol funds, we do bel-ie -e that i 
verbal testimony cited above in this Brief explaininq ~he writtP~ 
instruments and the intent thereof provide amp1e, it not :nandato: 
basis for this court to order thJ.t the B/\NK utilize> U"" ce~\ifica: 
The law affecting this question can ue clearly appli0ro tCJ \~1e f1c: 
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The general intent of the Utah legislature that written 
agreements should be enforced according to their terms is expressed 
in Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, §70A-9-20l: 
General validity of security agreement--
Except as otherwise provided by this act, a 
security agreement is effective according to its 
terms between the ?arties, against purchasers 
of the collateral and against creditors (Emphasis 
added) . 
Regarding agreements with respect to default, the 
Code states: 
[t]he parties may by agreement determine the 
standards by which the fulfillment of these rights 
and duties is to be measured if such standards 
are not manifestly unreasonable. 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, §70A-9-50l(3) 
Also, in the section dealing with the purpose of the 
enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, it is stated: 
The effect of provisions of this act may be 
varied by agreement, except as otherwise provided 
in this act and except that the obligations of good 
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care pre-
scribed by this act may not be disclaimed by agree-
ment but the parties may by agreement determine 
the standards by which the performance of such 
obligations is to be measured if such standards 
are not manifestly unreasonable. 
The presence in certain provisions of this 
act of the words ''unless otherwise agreed" or 
words of similar import does not imply that the 
effect of other provisions may not be varied by 
agreement under Subsection (3). 
Utah Code ~nn. 1953, as amended, §70A-l-l02(3)-(4). 
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The above authority firmly supports KENNEDY's contention 
t:-,at the ur.dis'-'utcd 1-:rittcn agrel'rrtents arnonq the parLL(_'" recJarrling 
collection on the note should be enfocced according to their terms, 
including enforcement against BARTON. 
If, hov1ever, the note ,_o-sic;ned by B11HTON is viewccl as 
tr.e original contract and the agreements regarding the collateral 
certificate are v1ewed as a subsequent modification of that same 
co~tract, the collateral agreements are J1everthcless enforceable 
according to their terms. See Birckart v. Greater Arizona Savings 
& Loan_Association, 101 Ariz. l6f, 438 P.2d 40'1 (1968), Pryo~2· 
P.2d 39 (1950). 
In ~irckart, ruling under Arizona Revised Statutes 
§'4-519, Subparagraph 4, which is identical to §70A-3-604, Sub-
paragraph 2, Utah Code Annotated, as amended 1965, the court held 
as to the effect of an C'ral accc1 i ar,,:) satl_sfac1 ion: 
As between the original parties there is no dif-
ference between a note payable to X and one pay-
able to the order X; tilL' di<ferc:>nce ilppear·s nnly 
after the J te come~ ir 1 ~..J tnr' ~ands (>[ a hc~Ldf"L 
in duo course, at lvhicJ, tlm,, 1 he lu.tt ccr nolc•, be i nq 
negotiable·, CJlVes the ltulder a riqht of act1on free 
of certain defenses agc:insl X, '.vhilc the former, 
being nor,nec;otiable, docs not. 
\'ie may, <:here fore, rcga!'u t.he note in lhc Ln-
stant case, as a simpl,_· contr"lct for Lhe paymc'nt 
of mo:1ey, ar.d--evcn though i:. rna'/ he 1 n vn~ it- i nJ--
it may be varied or di~chargcd by a new oral con-
trctct. 1·, I'Jilliston or: c:ontracts (Fe\'. Ed.) ~;lR2iL 
-~ec also 2 -P2st~z;~~~~:ili_t -of ~0:-~fG~ts, '1"~! 7. 
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We hold, therefore, that under both contract 
law and the N.I.L., an oral accord and satisfac-
tion will discharge the simple contract for the pay-
ment of money. 404 P.2d at 405. 
Numerous other cases support the rule that collateral 
oral agreements of the parties may be introduced to explain the 
written contracts. For example, in an action to recover personal 
property retained by a purchaser on real estate sold to him by 
vendors, Harmon v. Waugh, 414 P.2d 119 (Colo. 1966), the Supreme 
Court of Colorado held: 
The court did not err in admitting the evidence 
offered in order to determine the intent of the 
parties. There is a ~ealth of authority t~ sup-
port the proposition t'lat the "Parol Evi(-tetlCE 
Rule" does not operate to exclude oral agreements 
in explanation of a written instrument which patently 
does not contain all the terms and conditions of 
the contracting parties. See, 4 Williston on 
Contracts, §630(3d Ed., l96IT; 3 Jones, Commen-
taries on Evidence, §1490, 1491 (2d Ed., 1929) 
9 l'iigmore, Evidence, §2430 (3d Ed. 1940). 
In Coulter v. Anderson, 144 Colo. 402, 357 P.2d, 
we find the following pertinent language: 
"l~hether a contract was intended by the parties 
as an integrated one is, as indicated above, a 
matter of intention. See 3 Williston, Contracts 
§633 and 3 Corbin, Contracts §581. \vhere itiS 
shown that a writing was not intended to be fully 
integrated, terms other than those set forth in 
the writing may be proved by parol evidence, 
Fleming Construction Co. v. Scott, 141 Colo. 499, 
348 P.2d 701. 
4l4 P.2d at 121. Accord. Cromwell v. Gruber, 490 
P.2d 1285 (\'lash App. 1912). 
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The well-reasoned case of Sykes v. Everett, 83 S.E. 
585 (N.C. 1914) dealt vilth a fact si1·uation similar to the one 1n 
the instant case. There, the endorser of no':es cnc1orsC?d t.hom with 
the oral agreement that in case of default, the endorsee would not 
proceed aga1nst him unt the collateral was exhausted. The court 
held not only that evidC?ncc of the oral agreement was admissible 
to explain the sig11ature on the note, but also that the payee 
was bound by this agrceme!lt. The court explained: 
[w]hen a payee or regular endorsee thereof writes 
his name on the back of a note, as between him and 
a bona fide holder for value and without notice, 
the law 1mpJ LCS that he? intenrled to assume the \vell-
known l1abil1t, of an endorser, and he will not be 
permitted to contradict this implication; "but this 
rule d0es not apply between the original parties 
to a cor1rrac~ '.. 11ich is not in writing, although 
there may be the signature of one or more parties 
to authenticate that some contract was made. ln 
such cases it must always be a question of fact 
what contract the signature authorizes to be written 
above it; in other words, what was the agreement 
of the parties at the time it was written. There 
.is no written contract to be altered; the whole 
(except the signature, which by itself Jocs not make 
a contract) exists in parol, and must be established 
by such proof." 
8 3 S . E . a l 'i 8 R . 
The cases H~lied on by plaintiffs, holding thal 
a creditor having collateral security for his note, 
may, notwithstanding this fact, sue the debtor with-
out first t·ec;ort ing to the cnl lateral a11d exhausti ncJ 
it (Jones, Collateral Secur.it\· §686; Silvc·v v . 
. 1\xley, 11s N-:-~gsg-;--235.£. 933l, a.recfc;-tT:i r,ot 
in point, becc;use here the endorser has not only 
deposited the collateral, but required a further 
aC)reement that his enc1orc>"P should not proceed 
against him until it is e:<h,l\lc~ted. 
8 3 S . E. at '' 'Jrl . 
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The foregoing authorities firmly establish that the 
existence of the undisputed written agreement (Exhs. 17-P and 
21-P) which provided that the certificate of deposit would be 
a source of funds on default, as explained by the verbal testimony, 
should be upheld. The reasoning of the Sykes case, as applied 
here, means that BARTON's certificate should be used to discharge 
the note to the extent thereof, even if there were a separate 
agreement that BARTON would not be personally liable for a de-
ficiency. 
B. This court has the power to require entry of judg-
ment in accordance with a correct application of 
the law to the facts. 
This court need not make new findings on any of the 
issues concerning the point above discussed. All of the facts 
cited are undisputed, with the exception of the fact concerning 
whether or not there was an oral agreement that the certificate 
would be used first. A determination of that point is not neces-
sary. The court can properly construe that the bank had the 
right to pursue KENNEDY in the prior Sanpete County action (Exh. 
58-d) and, failing to collect from KENNEDY, to enforce the obliga-
tion against BARTON. The simple fact is that the BANK has con-
tinued to harass KENNEDY without any effort whatever to collect 
against BARTON or against the certificate. Irrespective of what 
the application of the law would have been in 1973, the facts 
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as viewed under the law in 1978 should require that the BANK 
take the certificate. 
In several different ways in the Complaint, plaintiffs 
requested that relief, i.e., Second Cause of Action (Paragraphs 
21-23) of J\JnendecJ Complcunt, (R. lOS), the Seventh Cause ot Ac-
tion (Paragraph 40, R. 112), the Eighth Cause of Action (Para-
graph 43, R. 113) and the Tenth Cause of Action ]Paragraph 49, 
R. ll4), and all saJ~d causes of actiort were disnnssed as a mattc'r 
of law by the court (R. 570, 1060 and 1061). These dismissals, 
as applied solely to the question of the offset ~f the savings 
certificate aga1nst the note, were wrongful. Un ler §76 {C!) Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court may reverse any order 
or judgment and may d1rect the trial court to enter judgment as 
corrected. Appellants' request that the court require offset of 
the certificate against the obligation for the reasons above-
stated. 
C. The doctrine of res judicata does not bar the relief 
sought by appellants. 
In B1\RTON's Fc,urth DeLcnse \k. J20' and 'i'liL R/\NK 
OF EPHRAHl's Third Defense (R. 142), defendants' claim that the 
doctrine of re~ jud1cata will uar the relief souqht by appellants. 
Specifically, by reason of the judgment obtained acJai nst >:ENNEDY 
in the prior act1on (Exh. 58-d), it is asserted that the court 
no longer has po~1er to require cnforccll1ent of the obl iq.1•~ions 
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against BARTON or the require use of the savings certificate in 
partial discharge of the KENNEDY judgment. The trial court's 
dismissal of plaintiffs' Second, Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Causes 
of Action or the portions thereof relating to the Certificate of 
Deposit, may have been based on ~he question of res judicata, 
at least in part. Appellants here submit that the doctrine of 
res judicata does not apply. 
Res judicata is a doctrine well recognized in the State 
of Utah, but has limited application. In Richards v. Hodson, 
26 U.2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044 (1971) the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Strictly speaking the term "res judicata' applies 
to a judgment between the same parties who in a 
prior action litigated the-rdentical questions 
which are present in the later case . 
The rule of law is wise in that it gives finality 
to judgments and also conserves the time of courts, 
to judgments and also conserves the time of courts, 
in that courts should not be required to litigate 
matters which have once been fully and finally 
determined. 
26 U.2d at 115 (Emphasis added). Accord. Belliston 
v. Texaco, Inc., 521 P.2d 379 (Utah-r974); Wheadon 
v. Pearson, 14 U.2d 45, 376 P.2d 914 (1962); East 
Mill Creek \'later Compa:r; v. Salt Lake City, l~ 
U.315, 159 P.2d 863 (1945). 
The related doctrine of collateral estoppel also requires 
identity of issues and prior adjudication on the merits. In Pen-
achio v. 1\lalker, 207 Kan. 54, 433 ?.2d 1119 (1971), the court ruled 
that a prior action, brought by an insurance company without proper 
right o::' subrogation and lvhich '::as dismissed on motion for summary 
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judgment for that reason, will not act as a bar to a subsequent 
action brought by the real parties in interest. The court stated: 
Although collateral estoppel is not as broad 
in scope as the doctrine of res judicata, the neces-
sary elements which make the two doctrines applicable 
are much the same. Without reviewing all the neces-
sary elements it will suffice for the purpose of this 
opinion to state that there must be a judgment on 
the merits \vhich determines -the rights and tl1e li-
abilities of the parties based on the ultimate facts 
as disclosed by the pleadings or issues presented 
for trial [citations omitted] and neither doctrine 
operates to affect those who are neither parties nor 
in privity therein [citiations omitted]. 
483 P. 2d at 1121 (Emphasis added) . 
The broad justification for the application of the doc-
trines of res iudicata and collateral estoppel is that when a part, 
has been heard on the merits on a particular issue, he should be 
precluded from litigating that identical issue in a subsequent 
action. See Home Owners Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. NorthwesJ 
Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 238 N.E.2d 55 (Hass. 1968); Gammel 
v. Ernst & Ernst, 72 N.".2d 364 (!'linn. 1955). 
We will briefly specify the reasons why the prior actioc, 
including KENNEDY's countercla1w, did not bar the present claims 
of KENNEDY on the certificate as above argued: 
1. KENNEDY's counterclaim in the prior action was~ 
The counter· 
claim of KENNEDY in the prior action contained allegations cancer~ 
ing business damases from interference and slander, hut no claim 
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was there raised about the certificate. In any event, there was no 
adjudication on the merits as to that counterclaim in the prior action 
and, therefore, res judicata or the more narrow collateral estoppel 
should not bar the present action. While there was a judgment for 
the BANK on the note in the prior action, KENNEDY's counterclaim 
was summarily dismissed without the taking of evidence or the hearing 
of argument. 
KENNEDY was deprived of the opportunity of a hearing on 
the merits of his counterclaim in the prior action because he relied 
upon representations made by Judge Harding that, should he submit 
a motion for continuance and a supporting affidavit, a continuance 
would be granted due to illness of his wife. The proper motion 
and affidavit were filed and the continuance was not granted, much 
to the surprise of CHARLES R. KENNEDY's then counsel, Weston Bayles. 
Having relied upon the continuance, no case was prepared to be 
presented on the counterclaim and, therefore, the issues presented 
in the counterclaim could not have been heard on the merits. 
2. The cause of action in the present action is not 
the same as that in the prior action. The prior action by THE BANK 
OF EPHRAIM against KENNEDY and BARTON sought judgment on a note. 
The present action is an action in tort; namely, for intentional 
interference with business relationships and slander, with addi-
tional claims relating to the certificate. 
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3. The parties 1n the two actions are not identica 
The prior action was brought by the nANK against KENNEDY and,noml! 
BARTON; KENNEDY's counterclaim 1n tiJilt action 1-1as dircct.:·cl solel\ 
against the BANK. The present action is against the BANK, its 
Directors and BARTON and his w1fe. 
4. The issues ra1sed in the present action were not 
adjudicated in the prior action. The issue before the court in 
The Bank of Ephraim v. Kennedy (Exh. S8-d) was liability on the m1 
Appellants contend that the judgment established only that the 
note was in default and that KENNEDYS were liable on the note, 
not how that liability was to be satisfied, and without un'f rcferfl 
to BARTON or the certificate. This theory is supported in that 
various courts have described a Judgment for the recovery of monel 
as a debt, evidence of a debt, or record of a debt. See 46 Am.Jur.l 
Judgments §232 (l%9i. 
In J & G Construction Co. v. Freeport CC.!._~l_<::_Sl_~ 129 s.r:.: 
834 (\~.Va. 1963), an action for execution on a judgment, the suprc· 
Court of Appeals of West Virginia described a judgment on prior iw 
debtedness as "a new debt of rhe luq/,cst diqnity." 1/.'1 s F.2d at 
838 (Emphasis added). 
The United States Supreme Court j n Pro'::_idc!J_t~vinSJS 
Life Assurance Society v. Ford, 114 U.S. f,JS (188'1) dcscribr>d a 
judgment for recovery of money as "a security of rec:nrrl :;ho,,·ing a 
debt du<? from one person to anotlJet·." l l 4 u . s . il t 6 4 l . 
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:a Appellants therefore assert that the judgment in The Bank 
1~ of Ephraim v. Kennedy represents a debt due on the note--that the 
KENNEDYs, some of the defendants in that action, were liable on 
the note. 
Entirely different issues, the alleged contravention of 
ot written and oral agreements regarding collection on the note and 
satisfaction throught the collateral, are involved in the present 
n~l action. KENNEDY's liability on the note, at least in this situation 
with the security agreements, does not necessarily determine the 
obligations of the parties with respect to collection on the note 
rf I as against BARTON and the collateral. 
Appellants respectfully submit that the requirements for 
application of the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral 
Jr. I estoppel are not present, and the trial court erred if it dismissed 
appellants' causes of action relating to the certificate on the 
,_ grounds that they were barred by the prior judgment. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CERTAIN INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY. 
A. The trial court improperly refused to give plaintiffs' 
proposed Instructions Nos. 2, 6, 16 and 17. 
Most of the instructions complained of are intimately 
tied in with the foregoing arguments relating to the Certificate 
of Deposit. The instructions are erroneous if they mislead the 
jury. This case presents a fairly unique situation by reason of 
the way the court divided up the rulings of law as compared with 
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the issues submitted to Lhe jury. lk~re specifically, the: court 
submitted to the iury plaintiffs' 1hird Cause of Action (damages 
suffered by r.,ason of lJ,tcrf,;encc ·,;lf:h business lru.nsilcl.ions in 
Montana), plaintiffs' Fourth Cause of Action (covering essentially 
the same subject matter) and parts of pi ai nt.i ffs' Fifth l'ause of 
Action (relatinq to i••U.crference b) UtCe defc~ndaJJt,; with plai_ntiffs' 
attempts to sell the Barton Synd~cate claims). If the IJANK had 
previously applied the collateral savings certificate in the manne1 
argued under Polnt I. above, the Bi'I~K would not have maintained a 
judgment with which it could levy a writ of attachment on certain 
Montana propert. c .~·:r b~ plinntiffs (Exh. '35-P). l'he iury v1as 
entitled to k~ow ~h~· ~~e BANK had nearly allowed the statute of 
limitations to go by on the enforcement of the note against BARTO:: 
(plaintiffs' proposed Instruction No.2, 1<. 494), vias enlitled to 
know about the effect of oral modification of written a•rreements 
(plaintiffs' proposed In~truct1on No.(,, H. 498) c~nd wets cr.titled 
to know the effect of the language on the promissory note signed 
by GEORGE BARTON to the effect that payment was guaranteed (plain-
tiffs' proposed Instruction No. 17, i', ')Of;, and E>iL 21-1'). Inc 
similar manner, the actual Instructions Hos. 25, :.!6 ancl 27 (R. 
468-470) glvinq the impression that the ho1c1or of the r•ote could 
sue either obl1::ror it chose, h'<'l-c' rn~-.icadjnq urtrle'r the facLs am' 
the law of this case. l\s argued un.~·--r Polnl .E. al;(lVC, t11c la\-I 
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as applied to the facts in the record should have required THE 
BANK OF EPHRAI11 to take the Certificate of Deposit and to enforce 
the obligations against BARTON along with enforcement against KEN-
NEDY. Since the jury was improperly instructed in the law on those 
points, the jury was misled when it considered the claims for 
damages resulting from THE BANK OF EPHRAH1's harassment of KENNEDY 
under the Third and Fourth Causes of Action. Either the jury should 
have been able to consider the correct law in balancing the factual 
cteterminations it had to make or the court was erroneous in not 
applying the Certificate of Deposit and thus eliminating the 
question of attachment on the judgment. 
The relief sought by appellants under this point is either 
a new trial on the issues submitted to the jury or, preferably, 
the relief applying the Certificate of Deposit as argued under 
Point I. above. 
Appellants have also complained about the failure of the 
court to give plaintiffs' proposed Instruction No. 16 (R. 507) 
relating to the law of contribution. This matter concerns the 
judgment rendered by the verdict on BARTON's Fifth Cause of Action 
under the counterclaim (R. 487 and 548). That judgment arose out 
of a note with The Barclay's Bank in California on which Barton 
was a guarantor along with KENNEDY (Exh. 42-d). BARTON paid the 
balancP of that note and obtained judgment in this action for the 
full amount paid by him. It is the position of appellants that 
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BARTON's remedy should have been only contribution for onc=-half 
of the amount due rather than the entire amount. 
The relevant law is: 
h'here two or more co-obligors are jointly or jointly 
and severally liable upon a contractual or quasi-
contractual obligation,and the rreditnr recovers 
judgment thereon, an oLL1gor who is compo'llcd to 
pay the whole or more than his share of such judg-
ment may, as a general rule, recover contribution 
from his co-debtors therefor. 
18 Am.Jur.2d, "Contribution" §58. 
Where a party is entitled to contribution, the 
general rule is that the measure of his recovery 
should not be the entire amount paid upon the 
principal obligat1on, but only the amount he has 
paid in excess of his share. 
18 Am.Jur.2d, "Contribution" §15. 
The Guaranty should as Exh. 42-d clearly evidencing that 
KENNEDY and BARTON were ,ointly and severally l1able for The Barcli 
Bank obligat1on. Under the applicable law, therefore, BARTON's 
sole remedy should have been one-half of the amount he paid and 
not the entire amount. Accordingly, the court's refusal to give 
plaintiffs' proposed Instruction No. 16 (R. 507) relating to con-
tribution was erroneous. In addition, the act~ual instruction No. 
24 (R. 466) relating to The Barclay's note was similarly erroneous 
because it set up the grounds for liability without specifying 
the applicable law of contribution. 
The relief sought by appellants under this point is 
straightfo1ward, i.e., the court should order the iudgmcnt on 
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BARTON's Fifth Cause of Action of the counterclaim reduced to half 
the present amount. 
B. Certain jury verdicts and judgments thereon are improper. 
BARTON's Third Cause of MCtion on the counterclaim sought 
$12,500.00 as a result of claimed proceeds from the sale of a 10% 
interest in the Barton Syndicate. The instruction concerning this 
matter is No. 21, R. 463. The basic evidence is that KENNEDY and 
BARTON sold to a Jerome D. Kennedy of California a 20% interest 
in the Barton Syndicate (10% from each of C. R. KENNEDY and BARTON) 
for the sum of $25,000.00 (Exh. 38-d). BARTON's half of that money 
was not remitted to him. In a separate transaction involving the 
Barton Syndicate, KENNEDY purchased 25% of the Barton Syndicate 
from a Mr. Rosenberger of California for the sum of $1,000.00 
(Exh. 50-P) . KENNEDY thereafter gave to BARTON one-half of the 
interest purchased from Rosenberger or 12-l/2%. The net effect 
was that BARTON sold 10% to J. D. Kennedy and received 12-l/2% 
back from the Rosenberger part of the transaction, thus ending 
up with a net gain of 2-l/2% without any transfer of money whatever. 
BARTON admitted that he received 12-1/2% from the Rosenberger trans-
action (R. 974). 
The jury, contrary to the instruction in the facts and 
the law, gave judgment for $12,000.00 to BARTON against KENNEDY 
(R. 486 and 561), having taken the $12,500.00 on one transaction 
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and offset $500.00 on the other transaction. Nejther Instruction 
No. 21 (R. 463) or ;omy of the> other instructions permitted the jur: 
to do that. Moreover, Instruction No. 2l improperly denied the 
plaintiff the opportunity to have set forth to the jury the possi~ 
finding that since BARTON vias made rr,ore than who] e by yet t i. ng J 2-l 
from the Rosenberger deal, the plaintjff KENNEDY was not obligated 
to return the money obtained on the J. D. Kennedy portion of the 
transaction. The net effect is, ~hat KENNEDY made the good deal 
and at the same time enriched BARTON by a net gain of 2-1/2% in 
the Barton Syndicate. 
The relief scught by appcl!nnts he>rc js either a new 
trial on the ~ssue of R'.RTON's Third Cause> of Action of the counter 
claim, or, preferabl c :'"rection from this court- that since BF,RT' 
was made more than whole by receiving 12-l/2% in exchange for his 
10% in the Barton Syndicate, the judgment rendered on the Third 
Cause of Action of the counterclaim should be null and void. 
CONCLUSIO)J 
Based on cl,e foregoing f<J.~·,:-., lill·l and clrquments, c1ppellc.r. 
respectfully request that tnis co.:~rt JrtCJdify certain port10I1S of Lire 
orders and judgments below in accordance with the specific request! 
made under each point of argumen L atJovc.:. 
Respe~tfully submitted, 
Ri\Y, ('"1c:NEY & NEBEKER 
By~~-:;_d(t (~. ~-~·--
D·~J :r E . ;\ 1 1 c n 
At tor rr c / s for P J a j n t i f rc~ 
an c1 i~ :-' 1 ) c l l an t s 
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